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Abstract
The sum secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of two fundamental multi-user network
structures, the K-user Gaussian multiple access (MAC) wiretap channel and the K-
user interference channel (IC) with secrecy constraints, have been determined recently
as K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 [1,2] and
K(K−1)
2K−1 [3,4], respectively. In this paper, we determine the entire
s.d.o.f. regions of these two channel models. The converse for the MAC follows from a
middle step in the converse of [1,2]. The converse for the IC includes constraints both
due to secrecy as well as due to interference. Although the portion of the region close
to the optimum sum s.d.o.f. point is governed by the upper bounds due to secrecy
constraints, the other portions of the region are governed by the upper bounds due
to interference constraints. Different from the existing literature, in order to fully
understand the characterization of the s.d.o.f. region of the IC, one has to study the
4-user case, i.e., the 2 or 3-user cases do not illustrate the generality of the problem. In
order to prove the achievability, we use the polytope structure of the converse region.
In both MAC and IC cases, we develop explicit schemes that achieve the extreme points
of the polytope region given by the converse. Specifically, the extreme points of the
MAC region are achieved by an m-user MAC wiretap channel with K−m helpers, i.e.,
by setting K −m users’ secure rates to zero and utilizing them as pure (structured)
cooperative jammers. The extreme points of the IC region are achieved by a (K −m)-
user IC with confidential messages, m helpers, andN external eavesdroppers, form ≥ 1
and a finite N . A byproduct of our results in this paper is that the sum s.d.o.f. is
achieved only at one extreme point of the s.d.o.f. region, which is the symmetric-rate
extreme point, for both MAC and IC channel models.
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47811, and presented in part at the Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, Pacific Grove,
CA, November 2013.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider two fundamental multi-user network structures under secrecy
constraints: K-user multiple access channel (MAC) and K-user interference channel (IC).
Information-theoretic security of communication was first considered by Shannon in [5] via
a noiseless wiretap channel. Noisy wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner who showed
that information-theoretically secure communication was possible if the eavesdropper was
degraded with respect to the legitimate receiver [6]. Csiszar and Korner generalized Wyner’s
result to arbitrary, not necessarily degraded, wiretap channels, and showed that information-
theoretically secure communication was possible even when the eavesdropper was not de-
graded [7]. Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman extended Wyner’s setting to a Gaussian channel,
which is degraded [8]. This line of research has been extended to many multi-user scenarios,
for both general and Gaussian channel models, see e.g., [9–30]. The secrecy capacity regions
of most of these multi-user channels remain open problems even in simple Gaussian settings.
In the absence of exact secrecy capacity regions, the behaviour of the secrecy rates at high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regimes have been studied by focusing on the secure degrees of
freedom (s.d.o.f.), which is the pre-log of the secrecy rates, in [1–4, 31–45]. In this paper,
we focus on the K-user Gaussian MAC wiretap channel and the K-user Gaussian IC with
secrecy constraints. The secrecy capacity regions of both of these models remain open. The
sum s.d.o.f. of both of these models have been determined recently as K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
[1, 2] and
K(K−1)
2K−1
[3, 4], respectively. In this paper, we determine the entire s.d.o.f. regions of these
channel models.
We start with the MAC wiretap channel, where multiple legitimate transmitters wish to
have secure communication with a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper; see
Figure 1. The converse for the sum s.d.o.f. is developed in [1,2] using two lemmas: the secrecy
penalty lemma and the role of a helper lemma, which, respectively, quantify the rate penalty
due to the existence of an eavesdropper, and quantify the impact of a helper (interferer) on
the rate of another legitimate transmitter. The achievability for the sum s.d.o.f. in [1, 2] is
based on real interference alignment [46,47] and structured cooperative jamming [18] with an
emphasis on simultaneous alignments at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
We develop the converse for the entire region by starting from a middle step in the converse
proof of [1, 2]. While [1, 2] developed asymmetric upper bounds for the secure rates, since
the sum s.d.o.f. was achieved by symmetric rates, [1, 2] summed up the asymmetric upper
bounds to get a single symmetric upper bound to match the achievability. We revisit the
converse proof in [1,2] and develop a converse for the entire region by keeping the developed
asymmetric upper bounds. Therefore, the converse proofs developed in [1, 2] to obtain a
converse for the sum s.d.o.f. suffice to obtain a tight converse for the entire region.
The converse region for the s.d.o.f. problem has a general polytope structure, as opposed
to the non-secrecy counterpart for the MAC which has a polymatroid structure [48]. Polytope
is a bounded polyhedron, which is an intersection of a finite number of half-spaces. Such
2
W2
W1 W2
WK XK
WK
WˆKW1
N1
N2
X1 Y1
Y2
X2
X3W3
Wˆ1 Wˆ2 · · ·
· · ·
Figure 1: K-user multiple access (MAC) wiretap channel.
definition is called a half-space representation, which is exactly the way our converse is
expressed. In order to show the achievability of the polytope region, we need to show the
achievability of boundaries of all of the half-spaces, which is inefficient. We use Minkowski
theorem [49, Theorem 2.4.5] which states that the polytope region discussed in this paper
can be represented by the convex hull of all of its extreme points, which there are only finitely
many. We, therefore, first determine the extreme points of this converse (polytope) region,
and then develop an achievable scheme for each extreme point of the converse region; the
achievability of the entire region then follows from time-sharing. In particular, each extreme
point of the converse region is achieved by an m-user MAC wiretap channel with K − m
helpers, for m = 1, . . . , K, i.e., by setting K − m users’ secure rates to zero and utilizing
them as pure (structured) cooperative jammers.
We then consider the IC with secrecy constraints; see Figure 2. In particular, we con-
sider three different secrecy constraints in a unified framework as in [3, 4]: 1) K-user IC
with one external eavesdropper (IC-EE), where K transmitter-receiver pairs wish to have
secure communication against an external eavesdropper. 2) K-user IC with confidential
messages (IC-CM), where there are no external eavesdroppers, but each transmitter-receiver
pair wishes to secure its communication against the remaining K − 1 receivers. 3) K-user
IC with confidential messages and one external eavesdropper (IC-CM-EE), which is a com-
bination of the previous two cases, where each transmitter-receiver pair wishes to secure
its communication against the K − 1 receivers and the external eavesdropper. The con-
verse for the sum s.d.o.f. (the sum s.d.o.f. is the same for all three models) was developed
in [3,4] by using the secrecy penalty lemma and the role of a helper lemma in a certain way,
and then by summing up the obtained asymmetric upper bounds into a single symmetric
upper bound. The achievability for the sum s.d.o.f. in [3, 4] is based on asymptotical real
interference alignment [46] to enable simultaneous alignment at multiple receivers.
In order to develop a converse for the entire region for the IC case, similar to the MAC
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Figure 2: K-user interference channel (IC) with secrecy constraints.
case, we start by re-examining the converse proof in [3,4] for the sum s.d.o.f. However, unlike
the MAC case, the original steps used for the sum s.d.o.f. are not tight for the characteriza-
tion of the entire region. There are two reasons for this: First, in the case of the MAC wiretap
channel, since there is a single legitimate receiver, each transmitter (helper/interferer) im-
pacts the total rate of all other legitimate transmitters at the legitimate receiver, and there-
fore, there is a single manner in which the role of a helper lemma is applied. In the IC case,
there are many different ways in which the role of a helper lemma can be invoked as there are
multiple receivers. In this case, by pairing up helpers (interferers) and the receivers we obtain
(K − 1)K upper bounds; even after removing the redundancies, we get (( K
K−1
))
=
(
2K−2
K−1
)
upper bounds. In order to obtain the tightest subset of these upper bounds, we choose the
most binding pairing of the helpers/interferers and the receivers. In particular, we do not
apply the next one (i.e., k = i− 1 and k = i+ 1) selection of helpers/interferers as we have
done in [3, Eqns. (24) and (45)]. Instead, we choose all of the transmitters as interfering
with a single transmitter-receiver pair; see (112) and (128) in this paper. This yields the
tightest upper bounds. Second, we observe that, when we study the s.d.o.f. region, we need
to consider the non-secrecy upper bounds for the underlying IC [50, 51] as additional upper
bounds. We note that such upper bounds are not binding for the case of MAC wiretap
channel s.d.o.f. region, or the MAC and IC sum s.d.o.f. converses. In fact, such non-secrecy
upper bounds for the IC are not binding even for the cases of K = 2 or K = 3. We observe
that these upper bounds are needed for the IC with secrecy constraints starting with K ≥ 4.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time in network information theory that K = 2
or K = 3 do not capture the most generality of the problem, and we need to study K = 4
to observe a certain multi-user phenomenon to take effect.
The converse region for the IC with secrecy constraints has a polytope structure as well,
and similar to the MAC wiretap channel case, we need to determine the extreme points of
this polytope region. However, different from the MAC wiretap channel case, the converse
region consists of two classes of upper bounds, due to secrecy and due to interference. This
makes it difficult to identify the extreme points of the converse polytope. Finding the
extreme points is related to finding full-rank sub-matrices from an overall matrix of size
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2K+K(K−1)/2. Since there are approximately KK such matrices, an exhaustive search is
intractable, and therefore we investigate the consistency of the upper bounds, which reduces
the possible number of sub-matrices to examine. After determining the extreme points of the
converse polytope, we develop an achievable scheme for each extreme point. In particular,
each extreme point of the converse region is achieved by a (K − m)-user IC-CM with m
helpers and N independent external eavesdroppers, for m ≥ 1 and finite N .
Finally, after characterizing the entire s.d.o.f. regions of the MAC and IC with secrecy
constraints, as a byproduct of our results in this paper, we note that the sum s.d.o.f. is
achieved only at one extreme point of the s.d.o.f. region, which is the symmetric-rate extreme
point, for both MAC and IC channel models.
2 System Model, Definitions and the Result
2.1 K-user Gaussian MAC Wiretap Channel
The K-user Gaussian MAC wiretap channel (see Figure 1) is:
Y1 =
K∑
i=1
hiXi +N1 (1)
Y2 =
K∑
i=1
giXi +N2 (2)
where Y1 is the channel output of the legitimate receiver, Y2 is the channel output of the
eavesdropper, Xi is the channel input of transmitter i, hi and gi are the channel gains
of transmitter i to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and N1 and
N2 are independent Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-variance. All the
channel gains are independently drawn from continuous distributions, and are time-invariant
throughout the communication session. We further assume that all hi and gi are non-zero.
All channel inputs satisfy average power constraints, E [X2i ] ≤ P , for i = 1, . . . , K.
Each transmitter i has a message Wi intended for the legitimate receiver. For each i,
message Wi is uniformly and independently chosen from set Wi. The rate of message i is
Ri
△
= 1
n
log |Wi|. Transmitter i uses a stochastic function fi : Wi → Xi where the n-length
vector Xi
△
= Xni denotes the ith user’s channel input in n channel uses. All messages are
needed to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. A secrecy rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) is said
to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0 there exist n-length codes such that the legitimate receiver
can decode the messages reliably, i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than ǫ
Pr
[
(W1, . . . ,WK) 6= (Wˆ1, . . . , WˆK)
]
≤ ǫ (3)
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and the messages are kept information-theoretically secure against the eavesdropper
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Y2) ≥ 1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WK)− ǫ (4)
where Wˆ1, . . . , WˆK are the estimates of the messages based on observation Y1, where Y1
△
=
Y n1 and Y2
△
= Y n2 .
The s.d.o.f. region is defined as:
D =
{
d : (R1, . . . , RK) is achievable and di
△
= lim
P→∞
Ri
1
2
logP
, i = 1, . . . , K
}
(5)
The sum s.d.o.f. is defined as:
Ds,Σ
△
= lim
P→∞
sup
∑K
i=1Ri
1
2
logP
(6)
where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rate tuples (R1, . . . , RK). The sum
s.d.o.f. of the K-user Gaussian MAC wiretap channel is characterized in the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 1 ([1, Theorem 1]) The sum s.d.o.f. of the K-user Gaussian MAC wiretap
channel is K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
for almost all channel gains.
In this paper, we characterize the s.d.o.f. region of the K-user Gaussian MAC wiretap
channel in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The s.d.o.f. region D of the K-user Gaussian MAC wiretap channel is the set
of all d satisfying
Kdi + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
dj ≤ K − 1, i = 1, . . . , K (7)
di ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , K (8)
for almost all channel gains.
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2.2 K-user Gaussian IC with Secrecy Constraints
The K-user Gaussian IC with secrecy constraints (see Figure 2) is:
Yi =
K∑
j=1
hjiXj +Ni, i = 1, . . . , K (9)
Z =
K∑
j=1
gjXj +NZ (10)
where Yi is the channel output of receiver i, Z is the channel output of the external eaves-
dropper (if there is any), Xi is the channel input of transmitter i, hji is the channel gain of
the jth transmitter to the ith receiver, gj is the channel gain of the jth transmitter to the
eavesdropper (if there is any), and {N1, . . . , NK , NZ} are mutually independent zero-mean
unit-variance Gaussian random variables. All the channel gains are independently drawn
from continuous distributions, and are time-invariant throughout the communication ses-
sion. We further assume that all hji are non-zero, and all gj are non-zero if there is an
external eavesdropper. All channel inputs satisfy average power constraints, E [X2i ] ≤ P , for
i = 1, . . . , K.
Each transmitter i intends to send a message Wi, uniformly chosen from a set Wi, to
receiver i. The rate of message i is Ri
△
= 1
n
log |Wi|, where n is the number of channel uses.
Transmitter i uses a stochastic function fi :Wi → Xi to encode the message, where Xi △= Xni
is the n-length channel input of user i. The legitimate receiver j decodes the message as
Wˆj based on its observation Yj. A secrecy rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) is said to be achievable
if for any ǫ > 0, there exist joint n-length codes such that each receiver j can decode the
corresponding message reliably, i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than ǫ for all
messages,
max
j
Pr
[
Wj 6= Wˆj
]
≤ ǫ (11)
and the corresponding secrecy requirement is satisfied. We consider three different secrecy
requirements:
1) In IC-EE, Figure 3(a), all of the messages are kept information-theoretically secure
against the external eavesdropper,
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Z) ≥ 1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WK)− ǫ (12)
2) In IC-CM, Figure 3(b), all unintended messages are kept information-theoretically
secure against each receiver,
1
n
H(WK−i|Yi) ≥
1
n
H(WK−i)− ǫ, i = 1, . . . , K (13)
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Figure 3: The receiver sides of the three channel models: (a) K-user IC-EE, (b) K-user
IC-CM, and (c) K-user IC-CM-EE, where WK−i
△
= {W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK}.
where WK−i
△
= {W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK}.
3) In IC-CM-EE, Figure 3(c), all of the messages are kept information-theoretically secure
against both the K−1 unintended receivers and the eavesdropper, i.e., we impose both
secrecy constraints in (12) and (13).
The s.d.o.f. region and the sum s.d.o.f. are defined as in (5) and (6). The sum s.d.o.f. of
the K-user IC-EE, IC-CM, and IC-CM-EE is characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 ([3, Theorem 1]) The sum s.d.o.f. of the K-user Gaussian IC-EE, IC-CM,
and IC-CM-EE is K(K−1)
2K−1
for almost all channel gains.
In this paper, we characterize the s.d.o.f. region of the K-user IC-EE, IC-CM, and IC-
CM-EE in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 The s.d.o.f. region D of K-user IC-EE, IC-CM, and IC-CM-EE is the set of
all d satisfying
Kdi +
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
dj ≤ K − 1, i = 1, . . . , K (14)
∑
i∈V
di ≤ 1, ∀ V ⊆ {1, . . . , K}, |V | = 2 (15)
di ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , K (16)
for almost all channel gains.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 Polytope Structure and Extreme Points
Let X ⊆ Rn. The convex hull of X , Co(X), is the set of all convex combinations of the
points in X :
Co(X)
△
=
{∑
i
λixi | xi ∈ X,
∑
i
λi = 1, λi ∈ R, and λi ≥ 0, ∀i
}
(17)
A set P ⊆ Rn is a polyhedron if there is a system of finitely many inequalities Hx ≤ h such
that
P =
{
x ∈ Rn | Hx ≤ h} (18)
A set P ⊆ Rn is a polytope if there is a finite set X ⊆ Rn such that P = Co(X). Then, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 5 ([49, Theorem 3.1.3]) Let P ⊆ Rn. Then, P is a bounded polyhedron if only
if P is a polytope.
Therefore, if P ⊆ Rn is a polytope, then it is a convex hull of some finite set X . By the
properties of the convex hull of a finite set X , P is a bounded, closed, convex set. Since P
is a subset of the Euclidean space, P is a compact convex set. An extreme point is formally
defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Extreme point) Let P ⊆ Rn. An x ∈ P is an extreme point if there are
no y, z ∈ P \ {x} such that x = λy + (1− λ)z for any λ ∈ (0, 1). Then, Ex(P ) is the set of
all extreme points of P .
Theorem 6 (Minkowski, 1910. [49, Theorem 2.4.5]) Let P ⊆ Rn be a compact convex
set. Then,
P = Co(Ex(P )). (19)
Minkowski theorem plays an important role in this paper, since it tells that, instead of
studying the polytope P itself, for certain problems, e.g., achievability proofs, we can simply
concentrate on all extreme points Ex(P ). Finally, the following theorem helps us find all
extreme points of a polytope P efficiently: We select any n linearly independent active/tight
boundaries and check whether they give a point in the polytope P .
Theorem 7 ([52, Theorem 7.2(b)]) x ∈ Rn is an extreme point of polyhedron P (H,h)
if and only if Hx ≤ h and H′x = h′ for some n× (n+ 1) sub-matrix (H′,h′) of (H,h) with
rank(H′) = n.
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3.2 Real Interference Alignment
In this subsection, we review pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) and real interference align-
ment [46, 47], similar to the review in [39, Section III]. The purpose of this subsection is to
illustrate that by using real interference alignment, the transmission rate of a PAM scheme
can be made to approach the Shannon achievable rate at high SNR. This provides a universal
and convenient way to design capacity-achieving signalling schemes at high SNR by using
PAM for different channel models as will be done in later sections.
3.2.1 Pulse Amplitude Modulation
For a point-to-point scalar Gaussian channel,
Y = X + Z (20)
with additive Gaussian noise Z of zero-mean and variance σ2, and an input power constraint
E [X2] ≤ P , assume that the input symbols are drawn from a PAM constellation,
C(a,Q) = a {−Q,−Q + 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (21)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number to normalize the transmit power. Note
that, a is also the minimum distance dmin(C) of this constellation, which has the probability
of error
Pr(e) = Pr
[
X 6= Xˆ
]
≤ exp
(
−d
2
min
8σ2
)
= exp
(
− a
2
8σ2
)
(22)
where Xˆ is an estimate for X obtained by choosing the closest point in the constellation
C(a,Q) based on observation Y .
The transmission rate of this PAM scheme is
R = log(2Q+ 1) (23)
since there are 2Q + 1 signalling points in the constellation. For any small enough δ > 0, if
we choose Q = P
1−δ
2 and a = γP
δ
2 , where γ is a constant independent of P , then
Pr(e) ≤ exp
(
−γ
2P δ
8σ2
)
and R ≥ 1− δ
2
logP (24)
and we can have Pr(e) → 0 and R → 1
2
logP as P → ∞. That is, we can have reliable
communication at rates approaching 1
2
logP .
Note that the PAM scheme has small probability of error (i.e., reliability) only when P
goes to infinity. For arbitrary P , the probability of error Pr(e) is a finite number. Similar
to the steps in [46, 53], we connect the PAM transmission rate to the Shannon rate in the
10
following derivation. We note that Shannon rate of I(X ; Y ) is achieveable with arbitrary
reliability using a random codebook:
R′ = I(X ; Y ) (25)
≥ I(X ; Xˆ) (26)
= H(X)−H(X|Xˆ) (27)
= log(2Q+ 1)−H(X|Xˆ) (28)
≥ log(2Q+ 1)− 1− Pr(e) log(2Q+ 1) (29)
≥
[
1− Pr(e)
]1− δ
2
logP − 1 (30)
where we use the Markov chain X → Y → Xˆ and bound H(X|Xˆ) using Fano’s inequality.
Therefore, we can achieve the rate in (30) with arbitrary reliability, where for any fixed
P , Pr(e) in (30) is the probability of error of the PAM scheme given in (24), which is a
well-defined function of P . For a finite P , while Pr(e) may not be arbitrarily small, the
rate achieved in (30), which is smaller than the rate of PAM in (23), is achieved arbitrarily
reliably. We finally note that as P goes to infinity Pr(e) goes to zero exponentially, and
from (30), both PAM transmission rate and the Shannon achievable rate have the same
asymptotical performance, i.e., PAM transmission rate has 1 Shannon d.o.f.
3.2.2 Real Interference Alignment
This PAM scheme for the point-to-point scalar channel can be generalized to multiple data
streams. Let the transmit signal be
x = aTb =
L∑
i=1
aibi (31)
where a1, . . . , aL are rationally independent real numbers
1 and each bi is drawn independently
from the constellation C(a,Q) in (21). The real value x is a combination of L data streams,
and the constellation observed at the receiver consists of (2Q+ 1)L signal points.
By using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation in number the-
ory, [46,47] bounded the minimum distance dmin of points in the receiver’s constellation: For
any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ, such that
dmin ≥ kδa
QL−1+δ
(32)
for almost all rationally independent {ai}Li=1, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. Since
1 a1, . . . , aL are rationally independent if whenever q1, . . . , qL are rational numbers then
∑L
i=1
qiai = 0
implies qi = 0 for all i.
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the minimum distance of the receiver constellation is lower bounded, with proper choice of
a and Q, the probability of error can be made arbitrarily small, with rate R approaching
1
2
logP . This result is stated in the following lemma, as in [39, Proposition 3].
Lemma 1 ([46, 47]) For any small enough δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which
is independent of P , such that if we choose
Q = P
1−δ
2(L+δ) and a = γ
P
1
2
Q
(33)
then the average power constraint is satisfied, i.e., E [X2] ≤ P , and for almost all {ai}Li=1,
except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, the probability of error is bounded by
Pr(e) ≤ exp (−ηγP δ) (34)
where ηγ is a positive constant which is independent of P .
Furthermore, as a simple extension, if bi are sampled independently from different con-
stellations Ci(a,Qi), the lower bound in (32) can be modified as
dmin ≥ kδa
(maxiQi)L−1+δ
(35)
4 S.d.o.f. Region of K-User MAC Wiretap Channel
In this section, we study the K-user MAC wiretap channel defined in Section 2.1 and prove
the s.d.o.f. region stated in Theorem 2. We first illustrate the regions for K = 2 and K = 3
cases as examples. We then provide the converse in Section 4.1, investigate the converse
region in terms of its extreme points in Section 4.2, and show the achievability of each
extreme point in Section 4.3.
For K = 2, the s.d.o.f. region in Theorem 2 becomes
D =
{
d : 2d1 + d2 ≤ 1,
d1 + 2d2 ≤ 1,
d1, d2 ≥ 0
}
(36)
and is shown in Figure 4. The extreme points of this region are: (0, 0), (1
2
, 0), (0, 1
2
), and (1
3
, 1
3
).
In order to provide the achievability of the region, it suffices to provide the achievability of
these extreme points. In fact the achievabilities of (1
2
, 0), (0, 1
2
) were proved in [40] in the
helper setting and the achievability of (1
3
, 1
3
) was proved in [1,2]. Note that (1
3
, 1
3
) is the only
sum s.d.o.f. optimum point.
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Figure 4: The s.d.o.f. region of the K = 2-user MAC wiretap channel.
For K = 3, the s.d.o.f. region in Theorem 2 becomes
D =
{
d : 3d1 + 2d2 + 2d3 ≤ 2,
2d1 + 3d2 + 2d3 ≤ 2,
2d1 + 2d2 + 3d3 ≤ 2,
d1, d2, d3 ≥ 0
}
(37)
and is shown in Figure 5. The extreme points of this region are:
(0, 0, 0)(
2
3
, 0, 0
)
,
(
0,
2
3
, 0
)
,
(
0, 0,
2
3
)
(
2
5
,
2
5
, 0
)
,
(
2
5
, 0,
2
5
)
,
(
0,
2
5
,
2
5
)
(
2
7
,
2
7
,
2
7
)
(38)
which correspond to the maximum individual s.d.o.f. (see Gaussian wiretap channel with
two helpers [40]), the maximum sum of pair of s.d.o.f. (see two-user Gaussian MAC wiretap
channel with one helper, proved in Section 4.3), and the maximum sum s.d.o.f. (see three-user
Gaussian MAC wiretap channel [1, 2]). Note that (2
7
, 2
7
, 2
7
) is the only sum s.d.o.f. optimum
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↓ (2/5, 2/5, 0)
  (2/5, 0, 2/5) →
Figure 5: The s.d.o.f. region of the K = 3-user MAC wiretap channel.
point.
4.1 Converse
The converse simply follows from a key inequality in the proof in [1]. We re-examine [1,
Eqn. (41)]:
nRi + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1
nRj ≤ (K − 1)h(Y1) + nci, i = 1, . . . , K (39)
where all {ci} in this paper are constants independent of P .
Clearly, (39) is not symmetric. However, the lower bound derived in [1] was achieved
by a symmetric scheme. Therefore, in [1], in order to obtain a matching upper bound, we
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summed up (39) for all i to obtain:
[K(K − 1) + 1]
K∑
j=1
nRj ≤ K(K − 1)h(Y1) + nc′ (40)
≤ K(K − 1)n
2
logP + nc′′ (41)
which provided the desired upper bound for the sum s.d.o.f.
Ds,Σ ≤ K(K − 1)
K(K − 1) + 1 (42)
which is the converse for Theorem 1.
In fact, (39) provides more information than what is needed for the sum s.d.o.f. only. In
this paper, we start from (39)
nRi + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1
nRj ≤ (K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nci, i = 1, . . . , K (43)
divide by n
2
logP and take the limit P →∞ on both sides to obtain,
di + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1
dj ≤ K − 1, i = 1, . . . , K (44)
that is,
Kdi + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
dj ≤ K − 1, i = 1, . . . , K (45)
which concludes the converse proof of Theorem 2.
4.2 Polytope Structure and Extreme Points
To prove that the region D in Theorem 2 is tight (i.e., achievable), we first express it in
terms of its extreme points, explicitly characterize all of its extreme points, and develop a
scheme to achieve each of its extreme points.
The region in Theorem 2 is a polytope, which is a convex hull of some finite set X ,
as discussed in Section 3.1. By the properties of the convex hull of a finite set X , D is a
bounded, closed, convex set. Since D ⊂ RK , D is a compact convex set. From Minkowski
theorem, the polytope D in Theorem 2 is a convex hull of its extreme points. Then, in order
to prove that D is tight, it suffices to prove that each extreme point of D is achievable.
Then, from convexification through time-sharing, all points in D are achievable.
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In order to speak of the polytope, we re-write the constraints in (7) and (8) as
Kdi + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
dj ≤ K − 1, i = 1, . . . , K (46)
−di ≤ 0 i = 1, . . . , K (47)
Then, we write all the left hand sides of (46) and (47) as an N × K matrix H with cor-
responding right hand sides forming an N -length column vector h, i.e., all points d in D
satisfy
Hd ≤ h (48)
where N
△
= 2K. By Theorem 7, exploring all extreme points of D is equivalent to finding
all sub-matrices (HJ ,hJ) of (H,h), such that
rank(HJ) = K (49)
and
HJd = hJ , and Hd ≤ h (50)
whereHJ is a sub-matrix ofH with rows indexed by the index set J , and hJ is the sub-vector
of h with rows indexed by J .
Let d ∈ D be a non-zero extreme point of D. Define a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , N} as
S
△
=
{
si
△
= s(i) : Hsid = hsi is Kdi + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
dj = K − 1, i = 1, . . . , K
}
(51)
where s(i) is a function of the coordinate i with the value as the row index ofH corresponding
to the active boundaries in (46). Similarly, define the set Z ⊆ {1, . . . , N} as
Z
△
=
{
zi
△
= z(i) : Hzid = hzi is di = 0, i = 1, . . . , K
}
(52)
where z(i) is a function of the coordinate i with the value as the row index ofH corresponding
to the active boundaries in (47). Clearly, S and Z are disjoint, i.e.,
S ∩ Z = φ (53)
For any row index set J , which corresponds to a set of active boundaries for d, we have
J = S ∪ Z (54)
For example, for the three-user case, K = 3, according to (46) and (47), we have H and
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h as
H =


3 2 2
2 3 2
2 2 3
−1 0 0
0 −1 0
0 0 −1


, h =


2
2
2
0
0
0


(55)
If the equalities with i = 1, 2 hold in (46) and the equality with i = 3 holds in (47), then the
corresponding sets S, Z, J are
S = {s1, s2} = {1, 2}, Z = {z3} = {6}, J = S ∪ Z = {1, 2, 6} (56)
with the row-index functions
si = s(i) = i (57)
zi = z(i) = i+ 3 (58)
In this example, it is easy to check that
rank(HJ) = rank



 3 2 22 3 2
0 0 −1



 = 3 = K (59)
and the solution given by HJd = hJ is
d =
(
2
5
,
2
5
, 0
)
(60)
which satisfies (50). Therefore, this is an extreme point.
For the general case, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8 A point d ∈ D of Theorem 2 is an extreme point if and only if it is equal to,
up to element reordering,(
∆, . . . ,∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
m items
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−m) items
)
, 0 ≤ m ≤ K (61)
where
∆ =
K − 1
m(K − 1) + 1 (62)
Proof: First, for any m, 0 ≤ m ≤ K, let the point d be as in (61). It is easy to check that
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the sub-matrix (HJ ,hJ), where
J =
{
si : 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
∪
{
zj : m+ 1 ≤ j ≤ K
}
(63)
satisfies all the conditions in Theorem 7, which means that d is an extreme point.
In order to show the other direction, we need to show that any extreme point d has the
structure in (61) for some m, 0 ≤ m ≤ K. To this end, we find the sub-matrix in Theorem
7.
If |Z| = K, due to (47), the sub-matrix HZ is simply a diagnoal matrix with −1s on the
diagonal, and consequently, rank(HZ) = K. Then, the solution of HZd = hZ is 0, which
satisfies (50). This extreme point corresponds to the case m = 0 in Theorem 8.
In the rest of the proof, we focus on non-zero extreme points, i.e., |Z| < K. Due to (46),
it is easy to verify that HS has |S| rows with rank(HS) = |S| where S is defined in (51). In
order to make rank(HJ) = rank(HS∪Z) = K, we need at least K − |S| more rows from H,
i.e., |Z| ≥ K − |S|. If S is empty, then |Z| ≥ K, which contradicts the assumption |Z| < K.
Therefore, S is non-empty, i.e., |S| ≥ 1.
First, we claim that
di = dk, ∀si, sk ∈ S (64)
If |S| = 1, there is nothing to prove, and we are done with the proof of (64). If |S| > 1,
consider any si, sk ∈ S, i 6= k. By the definition of S, we have
(K − 1)dk +Kdi + (K − 1)
∑
l 6=i,k
dl = K − 1 (65)
(K − 1)di +Kdk + (K − 1)
∑
l 6=i,k
dl = K − 1 (66)
which implies that di = dk for any si, sk ∈ S, proving (64) for |S| ≥ 1.
Next, we claim
di > 0, ∀si ∈ S (67)
If |S| = K, due to (64), (67) is trivially true since we are focusing on a non-zero extreme
point. If |S| < K, then we observe that
di ≥ dj, ∀si ∈ S, sj 6∈ S (68)
which indicates that for any si ∈ S the corresponding element in vector d is the largest one,
i.e., di = maxk dk, which implies (67). Hence, it now suffices to show (68). We prove it by
contradiction. Assume that there exists a coordinate j such that sj 6∈ S and dj is strictly
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larger than di for any si ∈ S. By the definition of S in (51), we have
K − 1 = Kdi + (K − 1)dj + (K − 1)
K∑
l=1,l 6=i,j
dl (69)
< Kdi + (K − 1)dj + (K − 1)
K∑
l=1,l 6=i,j
dl + (dj − di) (70)
= Kdj + (K − 1)di + (K − 1)
K∑
l=1,l 6=i,j
dl (71)
= Kdj + (K − 1)
K∑
l=1,l 6=j
dl (72)
which contradicts the constraint (46). Therefore, we must have (68) and consequently (67).
Finally, denote m
△
= |S|, and, without loss of generality, assume that S = {si : 1 ≤
i ≤ m}. By (67) and the definition of Z in (52), we note that zj ∈ Z only if sj 6∈ S.
Together with the constraint |Z| ≥ K − |S| = K − m, we conclude that we must have
Z = {zj : m+ 1 ≤ j ≤ K}, i.e., dj = 0 for m+ 1 ≤ j ≤ K. Thus, rank(HS∪Z) = K, and, by
(64), the solution given by the corresponding equations can be characterized as (61), which
satisfies (50), completing the proof. 
4.3 Achievability
The previous section showed that the converse region is a polytope with extreme points which
have m coordinates all equal to ∆ given in (62), and the remaining K −m coordinates all
equal to zero. It is clear that zero vector is an extreme point in D and is trivially achievable.
The rest of the achievability proof focuses on non-zero extreme points. In this section, we
prove that each of these extreme points is achievable. Without loss of generality, we prove
that the s.d.o.f. point of
d =
(
∆, . . . ,∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
m items
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−m) items
)
(73)
is achievable for all 1 < m < K with ∆ in (62). By symmetry, this proves the achievability
of all extreme points. Note that m = K is shown in [1, 2], and m = 1 is shown in [40].
Theorem 9 The extreme point d ∈ D given in (73) is achieved by m-user Gaussian MAC
wiretap channel with K −m helpers for almost all channel gains.
Proof: Consider the m-user Gaussian MAC wiretap channel with K − m helpers where
transmitter i, i = 1, . . . , m, has confidential message Wi intended for the legitimate receiver
and the remaining K − m transmitters serve as independent helpers without messages of
their own.
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In order to achieve the extreme point d in (73), transmitter i, i = 1, . . . , m, divides its
message into K − 1 mutually independent sub-messages. Each transmitter sends a linear
combination of signals that carry the sub-messages. In addition to message carrying signals,
all transmitters also send cooperative jamming signals Ui, i = 1, . . . , K, respectively. The
messages are sent in such a way that all of the cooperative jamming signals are aligned in
a single dimension at the legitimate receiver, occupying the smallest possible space at the
legitimate receiver, and hence allowing for the reliable decodability of the message carrying
signals. In addition, each cooperative jamming signal is aligned with at most K−1 message
carrying signals at the eavesdropper to limit the information leakage rate to the eavesdropper.
An example of K = 3, m = 2, and K −m = 1 is given in Figure 6.
More specifically, we use a total of m(K−1)+K mutually independent random variables
Vij, i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ {1, · · · , K} \ {i} (74)
Uk, k ∈ {1, · · · , K} (75)
where {Vij}j 6=i denote the message carrying signals and Ui denotes the cooperative jamming
signal sent from transmitter i. In particular, Vij carries the jth sub-message of transmitter
i. Each of these random variables is uniformly and independently drawn from the same
discrete constellation C(a,Q) given in (21), where a and Q will be specified later. We choose
the input signals of the transmitters as
Xi =
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gj
hjgi
Vij +
1
hi
Ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , m} (76)
Xj =
1
hj
Uj , j ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , K} (77)
With these input selections, observations of the receivers are
Y1 =
[
m∑
i=1
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gjhi
hjgi
Vij
]
+
(
K∑
k=1
Uk
)
+N1 (78)
and
Y2 =
K∑
j=1
gj
hj
(
Uj +
m∑
i=1,i 6=j
Vij
)
+N2 (79)
where the terms inside the parentheses (·) in (78) and (79) are aligned.
By [36, Theorem 1], we can achieve the following sum secrecy rate for the m users
sup
m∑
i=1
Ri ≥ I(V; Y1)− I(V; Y2) (80)
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Figure 6: Illustration of secure interference alignment for the s.d.o.f. triple (2
5
, 2
5
, 0) for the
two-user MAC wiretap channel with one helper; K = 3 and m = 2. Here, we define
Vi
△
= {Vij : j = 1, 2, 3, j 6= i} for i = 1, 2.
where V
△
= {Vij : i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ {1, · · · , K} \ {i}}.
By Lemma 1, for any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(m(K−1)+1+δ) and a = γP
1
2/Q, where γ is
a constant independent of P to meet the average power constraint, then
Pr
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
≤ exp (−βP δ) (81)
for some constant β > 0 (independent of P ), where Vˆ is the estimate of V by choosing the
closest point in the constellation based on observation Y1. This means that we can have
Pr[V 6= Vˆ]→ 0 as P →∞.
By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain V→ Y1 → Vˆ, we know that
H(V|Y1) ≤ H(V|Vˆ) (82)
≤ 1 + exp (−βP δ) log(2Q + 1)m(K−1) (83)
= o(logP ) (84)
where o(·) is the little-o function. This means that
I(V; Y1) = H(V)−H(V|Y1) (85)
= log(2Q+ 1)m(K−1) −H(V|Y1) (86)
≥ log(2Q+ 1)m(K−1) − o(logP ) (87)
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On the other hand, we can bound the second term in (80) as
I(V; Y2) ≤ I (V; Y2 −N2) (88)
=
K∑
j=1
H
(
Uj +
m∑
i=1,i 6=j
Vij
)
−H (U1, . . . , UK) (89)
≤ K log 2KQ + 1
2Q + 1
(90)
≤ K logK (91)
= o(logP ) (92)
where (90) is due to the fact that entropy of each Uj +
∑m
i=1,i 6=j Vij is maximized by the
uniform distribution which takes values over a set of cardinality 2KQ+ 1.
Combining (87) and (92), we obtain
sup
m∑
i=1
Ri ≥ I(V; Y1)− I(V; Y2) (93)
≥ log(2Q+ 1)m(K−1) − o(logP ) (94)
=
m(K − 1)(1− δ)
m(K − 1) + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (95)
By choosing δ arbitrarily small, we can achieve the sum s.d.o.f. of m(K−1)
m(K−1)+1
for almost all
channel gains, which implies that the s.d.o.f. tuple of(
(K − 1)
m(K − 1) + 1 , . . . ,
(K − 1)
m(K − 1) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m item(s)
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(K−m) item(s)
)
(96)
is achievable by symmetry, which is (73). 
5 S.d.o.f. Region of K-User IC with Secrecy Con-
straints
In this section, we study the K-user IC with secrecy constraints defined in Section 2.2
and prove the s.d.o.f. region stated in Theorem 4. To this end, we consider both IC-CM
and IC-EE and their combination IC-CM-EE in a unified framework. We first illustrate
the regions for K = 2, 3, 4 cases as examples. The purpose of presenting K = 4 as an
example is to show that, unlike the MAC case, starting with K = 4 interference constraints
become effective and binding. We then provide converses separately for IC-EE and IC-CM in
Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, respectively, which imply a converse for IC-CM-EE. Finally, we
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show the achievability for IC-CM-EE, which implies the achievability for IC-EE and IC-CM.
Specifically, we investigate the converse region in terms of its extreme points in Section 5.3
and show the general achievability in Section 5.4.
For K = 2, the s.d.o.f. region in Theorem 4 becomes
D =
{
d : 2d1 + d2 ≤ 1,
d1 + 2d2 ≤ 1,
d1, d2 ≥ 0
}
(97)
which is the same as (36), and is shown in Figure 4. Note that (15) is not necessary for the
two-user case, since summing the bounds 2d1 + d2 ≤ 1 and d1 + 2d2 ≤ 1 up gives a new
bound
d1 + d2 ≤ 2
3
(98)
which is the result in Theorem 3 and makes the constraint in (15) strictly loose.
In order to provide the achievability, it suffices to check that the extreme points (0, 0),
(1
2
, 0), (0, 1
2
), and (1
3
, 1
3
) are achievable. In fact the achievabilities of (1
2
, 0), (0, 1
2
) are similar
to [40] and will be shown in Section 5.3. The achievability of (1
3
, 1
3
) was proved in [3,4]. Note
that (1
3
, 1
3
) is the only sum s.d.o.f. optimum point.
For K = 3, the s.d.o.f. region in Theorem 4 becomes
D =
{
d : 3d1 + d2 + d3 ≤ 2,
d1 + 3d2 + d3 ≤ 2,
d1 + d2 + 3d3 ≤ 2,
d1, d2, d3 ≥ 0
}
(99)
and (15) is not necessary for the three-user case, either. This is because, due to the posi-
tiveness of each element in d, from the first two inequalities in (99), we have
3d1 + d2 ≤ 3d1 + d2 + d3 ≤ 2 (100)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ d1 + 3d2 + d3 ≤ 2 (101)
Summing the left hand sides up of (100) and (101) gives us
d1 + d2 ≤ 1 (102)
which is (15) with V = {1, 2}, and we have (15) for free from (99).
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The extreme points of this region are:
(0, 0, 0)(
2
3
, 0, 0
)
,
(
0,
2
3
, 0
)
,
(
0, 0,
2
3
)
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
)
,
(
1
2
, 0,
1
2
)
,
(
0,
1
2
,
1
2
)
(
2
5
,
2
5
,
2
5
)
(103)
which correspond to the maximum individual s.d.o.f. (see Gaussian wiretap channel with two
helpers [40] and Section 5.3), the maximum sum of pair of s.d.o.f. (proved in Section 5.3), and
the maximum sum s.d.o.f. (see three-user Gaussian IC-CM-EE in [3,4]). Note that, (1
2
, 1
2
) is
the maximum sum d.o.f. for a two-user IC without secrecy constraints, and (2
5
, 2
5
, 2
5
) is the
only sum s.d.o.f. optimum point. Finally, note the difference of the extreme points of the 3-
user IC in (103) from the corresponding 3-user MAC in (38), even though the s.d.o.f. regions
and the extreme points of the 2-user IC and 2-user MAC in (97) and (36) were the same.
For K = 4, the s.d.o.f. region in Theorem 4 becomes
D =
{
d : 4d1 + d2 + d3 + d4 ≤ 3,
d1 + 4d2 + d3 + d4 ≤ 3,
d1 + d2 + 4d3 + d4 ≤ 3,
d1 + d2 + d3 + 4d4 ≤ 3,
d1 + d2 ≤ 1,
d1 + d3 ≤ 1,
d1 + d4 ≤ 1,
d2 + d3 ≤ 1,
d2 + d4 ≤ 1,
d3 + d4 ≤ 1,
d1, d2, d3, d4 ≥ 0
}
(104)
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The extreme points of this region are:
(0, 0, 0)(
3
4
, 0, 0, 0
)
,
(
0,
3
4
, 0, 0
)
,
(
0, 0,
3
4
, 0
)
,
(
0, 0, 0,
3
4
)
(
2
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0
)
up to element reordering(
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
)
,
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0,
1
2
)
,
(
1
2
, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
)
,
(
0,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
)
(
3
7
,
3
7
,
3
7
,
3
7
)
(105)
Here, in contrast to the two-user and three-user cases, (15) is absolutely necessary. For
example, the point (3
5
, 3
5
, 0, 0) satisfies (14), but not (15). In fact, it cannot be achieved, and
(15) is strictly needed to enforce that fact.
Regarding the region in Theorem 4, as illustrated in the examples above, we provide a
few general comments here:
1) Although (15) only states the constraints for all pairs of rates, due to the same argument
in [51], it can equivalently be stated as
∑
i∈V di ≤ |V |2 for all |V | ≥ 2. We note that,
when |V | = K, the corresponding upper bound is strictly loose due to Theorem 1
in [3,4], and that is why such bounds were not needed in [3,4], where sum s.d.o.f. was
characterized.
2) As shown in the examples, when K = 2 or 3, (15) is not necessary. When K ≥ 4,
we need both (14) and (15) to completely characterize the region D. Neither of them
can be removed from the theorem. For example, the all 1
2
vector, (1
2
, 1
2
, . . . , 1
2
), satisfies
(15), but not (14). On the other hand, the point (K−1
K+1
, K−1
K+1
, 0, 0, . . ., 0), which has
only two non-zero elements, satisfies (14), but not (15) for any K ≥ 4. Therefore, (15)
emerges only when K ≥ 4. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that
K = 2 or K = 3 do not represent the most generality of a multi-user problem, and we
need to go up to K = 4 for this phenomenon to appear.
3) Different portions of the region D are governed by different upper bounds. To see this,
we can study the structure of the extreme points of D, since D is the convex hull of
them. The sum s.d.o.f. tuple, which is symmetric and has no zero elements, is governed
by the upper bounds in (14) due to secrecy constraints. However, as will be shown
in Theorem 10 in Section 5.3, all other extreme points have zeros as some elements,
and therefore are governed by the upper bounds in (15) due to interference constraints
in [50,51]. An explanation can be provided as follows: When some transmitters do not
have messages to transmit, we may employ them as “helpers”. Even though secrecy
constraint is considered in our problem, with the help of the “helpers”, the effect due
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to the existence of the eavesdropper in the network can be eliminated. Hence, this
portion of the s.d.o.f. region is dominated by the interference constraints.
5.1 Converse for K-User IC-EE
The constraint in (15) follows from the non-secrecy constraints on the K-user IC in [50,51].
We note that this same constraint is valid for the converse proof of IC-CM in the next section
as well.
In order to prove (14) in Theorem 4, we re-examine [3, Eqn. (23)]. Originally, we applied
[40, Lemma 2] in [3] by treating the signal from transmitter j as the unintended noise to its
neighboring transmitter-receiver pair j − 1, i.e., for any i = 1, . . . , K,
n
K∑
j=1
Rj ≤
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
h(X˜j) + nc1 (106)
≤ [h(YK)− nRK ] + [h(Y1)− nR1] + · · ·+ [h(Yi−2)− nRi−2]
+ [h(Yi)− nRi] + · · ·+ [h(YK−1)− nRK−1] + nc2 (107)
By noting that h(Yj) ≤ n2 logP + nc′j for each j, we have
2n
K∑
j=1
Rj ≤ (K − 1)n
2
logP + nRi + nc3 (108)
Therefore, we have a total of K bounds for i = 1, . . . , K. Summing these K bounds, we
obtained:
(2K − 1)n
K∑
j=1
Rj ≤ K(K − 1)n
2
logP + nc4 (109)
which gave
Ds,Σ ≤ K(K − 1)
2K − 1 (110)
completing the converse proof for the sum s.d.o.f. of IC-EE in [3] (also Theorem 3 in this
paper).
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Here, we continue from [3, Eqn. (23)] and re-interpret it as:
n
K∑
j=1
Rj ≤
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
h(X˜j) + nc5 (111)
≤ [h(Yi)− nRi] + · · ·+ [h(Yi)− nRi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−1 items
+nc6 (112)
= (K − 1)h(Yi)− (K − 1)nRi + nc6 (113)
≤ (K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
− (K − 1)nRi + nc7 (114)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , K} is arbitrary. Here, the second inequality means that we apply [40,
Lemma 2] by treating the signal from all transmitters j 6= i as the unintended noise to the
transmitter-receiver pair i.
Rearranging the terms in (114), dividing both sides by n
2
logP , and taking the limit
P →∞ on both sides, we obtain
Kdi +
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
dj ≤ K − 1, i = 1, . . . , K (115)
which is (14) in Theorem 4, completing the converse proof for IC-EE.
5.2 Converse for K-User IC-CM
When we studied the sum s.d.o.f. of IC-CM, we applied [40, Lemma 2] to [3, Eqn. (44)] by
treating the signal from transmitter j as the unintended noise to its neighbor transmitter-
receiver pair j + 1, i.e., for any i = 1, . . . , K
n
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rj ≤
K∑
j=1
h(X˜j)− h(Yi) + nc8 (116)
≤
[
K−1∑
j=1
[
h(Yj+1)− nRj+1
]]
+
[
h(Y1)− nR1
]− h(Yi) + nc9 (117)
=
K∑
j=1
[
h(Yj)− nRj
]− h(Yi) + nc9 (118)
By noting that h(Yj) ≤ n2 logP + nc′j for each j, we have
nRi + 2n
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rj ≤
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
h(Yj) + nc9 (119)
≤ (K − 1)n
2
logP + nc10 (120)
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Therefore, we have a total of K bounds for i = 1, . . . , K. Summing these K bounds, we
obtained
(2K − 1)n
K∑
j=1
Rj ≤ K(K − 1)n
2
logP + nc11 (121)
which gave
Ds,Σ ≤ K(K − 1)
2K − 1 (122)
completing the converse proof for the sum s.d.o.f. of IC-CM in [3] (also Theorem 3 in this
paper).
Here, we continue from [3, Eqn. (44)] and re-interpret it as follows: For any i ∈ {1, . . . , K},
we select
k
△
=
{
i− 1, if i ≥ 2
K, if i = 1
(123)
and then have
n
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rj ≤
[
K∑
j=1
h(X˜j)
]
− h(Yi) + nc12 (124)
≤ h(X˜k) +
[
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
h(X˜j)
]
− h(Yi) + nc13 (125)
≤ h(Yi)− nRi +
[
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
h(X˜j)
]
− h(Yi) + nc14 (126)
=
[
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
h(X˜j)
]
− nRi + nc14 (127)
≤ [h(Yk)− nRk] + · · ·+ [h(Yk)− nRk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−1 items
−nRi + nc15 (128)
= (K − 1)h(Yk)− (K − 1)nRk − nRi + nc15 (129)
≤ (K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
− (K − 1)nRk − nRi + nc15 (130)
which is
(K − 1)nRk + n
K∑
j=1
Rj ≤ (K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc15 (131)
Here, inequality (126) means that we apply [40, Lemma 2] by treating the signal from
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transmitter k as the unintended noise to the transmitter-receiver pair i. Similarly, inequality
(128) means that we apply [40, Lemma 2] by treating the signal from transmitter j 6= k as
the unintended noise to the transmitter-receiver pair k.
Rearranging the terms in (131), dividing both sides by n
2
logP , and taking the limit
P →∞ on both sides, we obtain
Kdk +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
dj ≤ K − 1, k = 1, . . . , K (132)
which is (14) in Theorem 4, completing the converse proof for IC-CM.
5.3 Polytope Structure and Extreme Points
Similar to the discussion and approach in the MAC problem in Section 4.2, it is easy to see
that the region D characterized by Theorem 4 is a polytope, which is equal to the convex
combinations of all extreme points of D due to Theorem 6. Therefore, in order to show the
tightness of region D, it suffices to prove that all extreme points of D are achievable.
We first assume that K ≥ 3, and determine the structure of all extreme points of D in
the following theorem.
Theorem 10 For the K-dimensional region D, K ≥ 3, in Theorem 4, any extreme point
must be a point with one of the following structures:
(0, 0, . . . , 0), (133)(K − 1− p
K − p ,
1
K − p, . . . ,
1
K − p︸ ︷︷ ︸
p items
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m items
)
, K − 2 ≥ p ≥ 0, m = K − 1− p ≥ 1
(134)( 1
2
, . . . ,
1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
p′ items
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′ items
)
, K − 2 ≥ p′ ≥ 3, m′ ≥ 1, p′ +m′ = K ≥ 5
(135)( K − 1
2K − 1 ,
K − 1
2K − 1 , . . . ,
K − 1
2K − 1
)
(136)
up to element reordering.
The proof of Theorem 10 is provided in Appendix A.
Now, in order to show the tightness of region D, it suffices to show the achievability
for each structure in Theorem 10. Clearly, the zero vector in (133) is trivially achievable.
The symmetric tuple in (136) is achievable due to [3, 4]. Therefore, it remains to show the
achievability of the structures in (134) and (135).
29
In order to address the achievabilities of (134) and (135), we formulate a new channel
model as a (p+1)-user IC-CM-EE channel with m independent helpers and N independent
external eavesdroppers. The formal definition of this channel model is given in Section 5.4.
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 11 For the (p + 1)-user IC-CM-EE channel with m independent helpers and N
independent external eavesdroppers, as far as p ≥ 0, m ≥ 1, and N is finite, the following
s.d.o.f. tuple is achievable:
( m
m+ 1
,
1
m+ 1
,
1
m+ 1
, . . . ,
1
m+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p items
)
(137)
for almost all channel gains.
The proof of Theorem 11 is provided in Section 5.4.
Here, we provide a few comments about Theorem 11. Theorem 11 provides quite general
results, and subsumes some other known cases:
1) The result in [40] is a special case of Theorem 11 with p = 0, m ≥ 1, N = 1.
2) (134) is a special case of Theorem 11 with p ≥ 0, m = K − 1− p ≥ 1, N = m+ 1.
3) (135) is a byproduct of Theorem 11: By choosing p = p′ − 1, m = 1, N = m′ + 1, we
know that with just one helper, the following s.d.o.f. tuple is achievable:
( 1
2
,
1
2
, . . . ,
1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
p′ items
, 0
)
(138)
Now, if we addm′−1 more independent helpers into the network, (135) can be achieved
trivially.
Therefore, with the help of Theorem 11, each structure in Theorem 10 can be achieved,
which provides the achievability proof for Theorem 4 for K ≥ 3.
Finally, we address the K = 2 case. In this case, the region D characterized by (14)-(16)
in Theorem 4 is given by (97). In order to provide the achievability, it suffices to prove that
the extreme points (1
2
, 0), (0, 1
2
), and (1
3
, 1
3
) are achievable. The achievability of (1
3
, 1
3
) was
proved in [3, 4]. The achievabilities of (1
2
, 0), (0, 1
2
) are the special cases of Theorem 11 with
p = 0, m = 1, N = 2.
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5.4 Achievability
The (p+1)-user IC-CM-EE channel withm independent helpers and N independent external
eavesdroppers is
Yi =
p+1+m∑
j=1
hjiXj +Ni, i = 1, . . . , p+ 1 (139)
Zk =
p+1+m∑
j=1
gjkXj +Nzk , k = 1, . . . , N (140)
where Yi is the channel output of receiver i, Zk is the channel output of external eavesdropper
k, Xj is the channel input of transmitter j, hji is the channel gain of the jth transmitter to
the ith receiver, gjk is the channel gain of the jth transmitter to the kth eavesdropper, and
{N1, . . . , Np+1, Nz1, . . . , NzN} are mutually independent zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian
random variables. All the channel gains are independently drawn from continuous distri-
butions, and are time-invariant throughout the communication session. We further assume
that all hji and gjk are non-zero. All channel inputs satisfy average power constraints,
E
[
X2j
] ≤ P , for j = 1, . . . , p+ 1 +m.
Transmitter j, j = p+2, . . . , p+1+m, is an independent helper in the network. On the
other hand, each transmitter i, i = 1, . . . , p+ 1, has a message Wi intended for the receiver
Yi. A rate tuple (R1, . . . , Rp+1) is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0, there exist joint
n-length codes such that each receiver i can decode the corresponding message reliably, i.e.,
the probability of decoding error is less than ǫ for all messages,
max
i
Pr
[
Wi 6= Wˆi
]
≤ ǫ (141)
where Wˆi is the estimation based on its observation Yi. The secrecy constraints are defined
as follows:
1
n
H(W p+1−i |Yi) ≥
1
n
H(W p+1−i )− ǫ, i = 1, . . . , p+ 1 (142)
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,Wp+1|Zk) ≥ 1
n
H(W1, . . . ,Wp+1)− ǫ, k = 1, . . . , N (143)
where W p+1−i
△
= {W1, . . . ,Wp+1}\{Wi}. A s.d.o.f. tuple, (d1, . . . , dp+1), is achievable if there
exists an achievable rate tuple (R1, . . . , Rp+1) such that
di = lim
P→∞
Ri
1
2
logP
(144)
for i = 1, . . . , p+ 1.
Now, we prove Theorem 11, i.e., for p ≥ 0, m ≥ 1, and N is finite, the following
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s.d.o.f. tuple is achievable:
( m
m+ 1
,
1
m+ 1
,
1
m+ 1
, . . . ,
1
m+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p items
)
(145)
for almost all channel gains.
The purpose of Theorem 11 is to prove the achievability of the structure (134) in Theorem
10. As shown in (134), we partition the transmitters into three groups: 1) the first group
consists of only one transmitter with the largest s.d.o.f., K−1−p
K−p
, which is no smaller than 1
2
, 2)
the second group consists of p ≥ 0 transmitters with the same s.d.o.f., 1
K−p
, which is no larger
than 1
2
, and 3) the third group consists ofm ≥ 1 transmitters serving as independent helpers.
Therefore, in (145), we consider the (p + 1)-user IC with m helpers where K = p + 1 +m.
Therefore, (145) and Theorem 11 show the achievability of (134). We know from remark 2)
above that the achievability of (135) is a byproduct of Theorem 11. Also, (133) is trivially
achieved, and the achievability of (136) is shown in [3, 4]. Therefore, we focus on Theorem
11, from this point on.
The technique we use in the proof of Theorem 11 is asymptotical interference alignment
[46] and structured cooperative jamming [18]. The alignment scheme is illustrated in Figure 7
withm = 3, p = 2, N = 1. In Figure 7, we partition the transmitters into three groups, which
are {X1} as the first group, p = 2 other transmitters {X2, X3} as the second group, and
m = 3 helpers as the third group. From the perspective of Y1 and the eavesdropper Z, due
to the existence of independent helpers, the alignment signaling design is similar to that in
wiretap channel with helpers in [40, Fig. 4]. However, from the perspective of Y2, Y3, and the
eavesdropper Z, the alignment signaling design is similar to that in the interference channel
in [3, Fig. 2] (see the details of the corresponding design in [4]). This suggests that the
signalling scheme that achieves on arbitrary extreme point of the s.d.o.f. region is in between
the signalling scheme that achieves the sum s.d.o.f. of IC-CM-EE in [3,4] and the signalling
scheme used in the helper network in [40]. Furthermore, if we let p = 0, the signaling scheme
in Figure 7 would be almost identical to [40, Fig. 4]. However, we cannot let m be equal to
0. As far as the number of independent helper(s) in Figure 7, m, is non-zero, in contrast to
the scheme in [3, Fig. 2], the legitimate transmitters in the first and second groups do not
send cooperative jamming signals by themselves, however, in [3, 4] for IC-CM-EE without
helpers, each legitimate transmitter needed to send both message signals and a cooperative
signal. Note that in Figure 7 here, legitimate transmitters {X1, X2, X3} do not send any
cooperative jamming signals (no shaded boxes).
Here, we give the general achievable scheme. Let l be a large constant. Let us define a
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Figure 7: Illustration of secure interference alignment of Theorem 11 with m = 3, p = 2, N =
1.
set T1 which will represent dimensions as follows:
T1
△
=



 ∏
(j,k)∈L
h
rjk
jk

( N∏
k=1
p+1+m∏
j=1
g
sjk
jk
)
: rjk, sjk ∈ {1, . . . , l}

 (146)
where L contains almost all pairs corresponding to the cross-link channel gains
L =
{
(j, k) : j ∈ {2, . . . , p+ 2}, k = 1
}
∪
{
(j, k) : j ∈ {1, . . . , p+ 1 +m}, k ∈ {2, . . . , p+ 1}, j 6= k
}
(147)
Clearly, starting from the second helper Xp+3, if there exists any, the cross-link channel gains
to the first legitimate receiver Y1 are not in the set L. Therefore, we define the sets {Tj}mj=2
Tj =
1
hp+1+j,1
T1, j = 2, . . . , m (148)
Let Mi be the cardinality of Ti, i = 1, . . . , m. Note that all Mi are the same, thus we denote
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them as M ,
M
△
= l|L|+N(p+1+m) = lθ (149)
where θ
△
= (p+ 1 +m)p + p+N(p+ 1 +m) + 1.
Let tij and t(j) be the vector containing all the elements in the set Tj for any possible i.
Therefore, tij and t(j) are M-dimensional vectors containing M rationally independent real
numbers in Tj. The sets tij and t(j) will represent the dimensions along which message signals
are transmitted. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 7, for each legitimate transmitter
i, i = 1, . . . , p + 1, the message signal Vi1 is transmitted in dimensions ti1. In order to
asymptotically align U1 from the first helper Xp+2 with all Vi1s, the cooperative jamming
signal U1 is transmitted in dimensions t(1). Similarly, for the first transmitter X1, the
message signal V1j , j = 2, . . . , m, is transmitted in dimensions t1j. Since we want to align
the cooperative jamming signal Uj from the helper Xp+1+j with V1j one by one, the jamming
signal Uj is transmitted in dimensions t(j).
Let us define an mM dimensional vector b1 by stacking ti1s as
bT1 =
[
tT11, t
T
12, . . . , t
T
1m
]
(150)
Then, transmitter 1 generates a vector a1, which contains a total of mM discrete signals
each identically and independently drawn from C(a,Q) given in (21). For convenience, we
partition this transmitted signal as
aT1 =
[
vT11,v
T
12, . . . ,v
T
1m
]
(151)
where v1j represents the information symbols in V1j . Each of these vectors has length M ,
and therefore, the total length of a1 is mM . The channel input of transmitter 1 is
x1 = a
T
1 b1 (152)
Similarly, for the second group transmitters Xi, i = 2, . . . , p + 1, let bi be bi = ti1.
Then, transmitter i generates a vector ai = vi1, which contains a total of M discrete signals
each identically and independently drawn from C(a,Q) given in (21). The channel input of
transmitter i is
xi = a
T
i bi = v
T
i1ti1, i = 2, . . . , p+ 1 (153)
Finally, for the third group transmitters Xk, k = p + 2, . . . , p + 1 + m, serving as the
helpers, let bk be bk = t(k−p−1). Then, helper k generates a vector uk−p−1 representing
the cooperative jamming signal in Uk−p−1, which contains a total of M discrete signals
each identically and independently drawn from C(a,Q) given in (21). The channel input of
transmitter k is
xk = u
T
k−p−1bk = u
T
k−p−1t(k−p−1), k = p+ 2, . . . , p+ 1 +m (154)
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Before we investigate the performance of this signalling scheme, we analyze the structure
of the received signals at the receivers. To see the detailed dimension structure of the received
signals at the receivers, let us define T˜i as a superset of Ti, as follows
T˜1
△
=



 ∏
(j,k)∈L
h
rjk
jk

( N∏
k=1
p+1+m∏
j=1
g
sjk
jk
)
: rjk, sjk ∈ {1, . . . , l + 1}

 (155)
T˜j =
1
hp+1+j,1
T˜1, j = 2, 3, . . . , m (156)
where L is defined in (147) and the cardinalities of all Ti sets are the same and are denoted
as M˜ = (l+1)θ. Also, it is easy to check that since pair (p+1+ j, 1) 6∈ L for j ≥ 2, we must
have
T˜i ∩ T˜j = φ (157)
for all i 6= j.
We first focus on receiver 1, which has the channel output
y1 =
p+1+m∑
i=1
hi1x1 + n1 (158)
Substituting (152), (153) and (154) into (158), we get
y1 = h11x1 +
p+1∑
j=2
hj1xj +
p+1+m∑
k=p+2
hk1xk + n1 (159)
= h11
(
m∑
i=1
vT1it1i
)
+
(
p+1∑
j=2
hj1v
T
j1tj1
)
+
(
p+1+m∑
k=p+2
hk1u
T
k−p−1t(k−p−1)
)
+ n1 (160)
=
(
vT11h11t11
)
+
(
vT12h11t12
)
+ . . .+
(
vT1mh11t1m
)
+
( p+1∑
j=2
hj1v
T
j1tj1 +
p+1+m∑
k=p+2
hk1u
T
k−p−1t(k−p−1)
)
+ n1 (161)
Since vij and uk−p−1 are integer signals in C(a,Q), it suffices to study their dimensions. In
addition, note that tij and t(j) represent the same dimensions in Tj defined in (146) and
(148). It is easy to verify that
hj1T1 ⊆ T˜1, j = 2, . . . , p+ 1 (162)
hk1Tk−p−1 ⊆ T˜1, k = p+ 2, . . . , p+ 1 +m (163)
which implies that except the intended message signals v1i, i = 1, . . . , m, all unintended
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signals including message signals and cooperative jamming signals are all transmitted in the
dimensions belonging to T˜1. On the other hand, for intended signals,
h11T1 ⊂ h11T˜1 (164)
h11Ti ⊆ h11T˜i = h11
hp+1+i,1
T˜1, i = 2, . . . , m (165)
Note that the pair (p+ 1 + i, 1) 6∈ L for i ≥ 2 which implies that
h11T˜i ∩ h11T˜j = φ (166)
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, i 6= j. Furthermore, (1, 1) 6∈ L either, which implies that
h11T˜i ∩ T˜1 = φ, i ∈ {1, . . . , m} (167)
Together with (166), this indicates that the dimensions are separable as suggested by the
parentheses in (161) and also the Y1 side of Figure 7, which further implies that all the
elements in the set
R1
△
=
(
m⋃
j=1
h11T˜j
)
∪ T˜1 (168)
are rationally independent, and thereby the cardinality of R1 is
MR
△
= |R1| = (m+ 1)M˜ = (m+ 1)(l + 1)θ (169)
For the legitimate receivers Yi, i = 2, . . . , p + 1, without loss of generality, we focus on
receiver 2; by symmetry, a similar structure will exist at all other receivers. We observe that
y2 = h12x1 +
p+1∑
j=2
hj2xj +
p+1+m∑
k=p+2
hk2xk + n2 (170)
= h12
(
m∑
i=1
vT1it1i
)
+
(
p+1∑
j=2
hj2v
T
j1tj1
)
+
(
p+1+m∑
k=p+2
hk2u
T
k−p−1t(k−p−1)
)
+ n2 (171)
=
(
h22v
T
21t21
)
+
(
vT11h12t11 +
p+1∑
j=3
vTj1hj2tj1 + u
T
1 hp+2,2t(1)
)
+
(
vT12h12t12 + u
T
2 hp+3,2t(2)
)
+ . . .+
(
vT1mh12t1m + u
T
mhp+1+m,2t(m)
)
+ n2 (172)
Similarly, we observe that in the second set of parentheses of (172), since ti1 and t(1) represent
the same dimensions in T1 for all i, we have
hi2T1 ⊆ T˜1, i ∈ {1, . . . , p+ 2}, i 6= 2 (173)
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Starting from the third set of parentheses of (172), we have
h12Tj ⊆ T˜j (174)
hp+1+j,2Tj ⊆ T˜j (175)
for all j = 2, . . . , m. In addition, since the pair (2, 2) 6∈ L, we can infer that
h22T1 ⊆ h22T˜1 (176)
and
h22T˜1 ∩ T˜j (177)
for j = 1, . . . , m. Together with (157), this indicates that the dimensions are separable as
suggested by the parentheses in (172) and also the Y2 side of Figure 7, which further implies
that all the elements in the set
R2
△
=
(
m⋃
j=1
T˜j
)
∪ h22T˜1 (178)
are rationally independent, and thereby the cardinality of R2 is MR in (169).
For the external eavesdropper Zk, we note that
zk = g1kx1 +
p+1∑
j=2
gjkxj +
p+1+m∑
i=p+2
gikxi + nzk (179)
= g1k
(
m∑
i=1
vT1it1i
)
+
(
p+1∑
j=2
gjkv
T
j1tj1
)
+
(
p+1+m∑
i=p+2
giku
T
i−p−1t(i−p−1)
)
+ nzk (180)
=
(
vT11g1kt11 +
p+1∑
j=2
vTj1gjktj1 + u
T
1 gp+2,kt(1)
)
+
(
vT12g1kt12 + u
T
2 gp+3,kt(2)
)
+ . . .+
(
vT1mg1kt1m + u
T
mgp+1+m,kt(m)
)
+ nzk (181)
In the first set of parentheses of (181), since ti1 and t(1) represent the same dimensions in T1
for all i, we have
gikT1 ⊆ T˜1, i ∈ {1, . . . , p+ 2} (182)
Starting from the second set of parentheses of (181), we have
g1kTj ⊆ T˜j (183)
gp+1+j,kTj ⊆ T˜j (184)
for all j = 2, . . . , m. Due to (157), this indicates that the dimensions are separable as
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suggested by the parentheses in (181) and also the Z side of Figure 7, which further implies
that all the elements in the set
RZ
△
=
(
m⋃
j=1
T˜j
)
(185)
are rationally independent, and thereby the cardinality of RZ is MRZ
MRZ
△
= |RZ| = mM˜ = m(l + 1)θ (186)
We will compute the secrecy rates achievable with the asymptotic alignment based scheme
proposed above by using the following theorem.
Theorem 12 ([4, Theorem 2]) For K ′-user interference channels with confidential mes-
sages, the following rate region is achievable
Ri ≥ I(Vi; Yi)− max
j∈K′
−i
I(Vi; Y
′
j |V K
′
−i ), i = 1, . . . , K
′ (187)
where V K
′
−i
△
= {Vj}K ′j=1,j 6=i and K′−i = {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , K ′}. The auxiliary random
variables {Vi}K ′i=1 are mutually independent, and for each i, we have the following Markov
chain Vi → X ′i → (Y ′1 , . . . , Y ′K ′).
We can reinterpret Theorem 12 as follows: For the (p+1)-user IC-CM-EE with m helpers
and N external eavesdroppers, since each independent helper’s contribution is the same as
noise to both items in (187), which depend only on marginal distributions, we can treat the
(p+1)-user IC-CM-EE channel as a (p+1+N)-user IC-CM with N new transmitters which
keep silent, i.e., Vi and X
′
i, i = p+ 2, . . . , p+ 1 +N , are equal to zero, and
p(y′1, . . . , y
′
p+1+N |x′1, . . . , x′p+1+N) = p(y1, . . . , yp+1, z1, . . . , zN |x1, . . . , xp+1) (188)
where x′ and y′ are the transmitter and receiver of the (p + 1 + N)-user IC-CM and x, y, z
are the entities of the original (p+1)-user IC-CM-EE with m helpers and N external eaves-
dropper.
We thereby first select Vi as
V1
△
= a1 (189)
Vi
△
= vi1, i = 2, . . . , p+ 1 (190)
where a1 is defined in (151). Then, we evaluate the (187) for i = 1, . . . , p+ 1.
For i = 1, by Lemma 1, for any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(MR+δ) and a = γ1P
1
2
Q
, the
probability of error of estimating V1 as V˜1 based on Y1 can be upper bounded by
Pr(e1) ≤ exp
(−ηγ1P δ) (191)
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Furthermore, by Fano’s inequality, we can conclude that
I(V1; Y1) ≤ I(V1; V˜1) (192)
= H(V1)−H(V1|V˜1) (193)
≥ mM(1 − δ)
MR + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (194)
=
m(1− δ)
(m+ 1)
(
1 + 1
l
)θ
+ δ
lθ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (195)
where o(·) is the little-o function. This provides a lower bound for the first term in (187)
with i = 1.
Next, we need to derive an upper bound for the second item in (187), i.e, the secrecy
penalty, for i = 1. For and j ∈ {2, . . . , p+ 1}, by the Markov chain,
V1 →
(
p+1∑
k=1
hkjXkj, V
p+1
2
)
→ Yj (196)
we have
I(V1; Yj|V p+12 ) ≤ I
(
V1;
p+1∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V p+12
)
(197)
= H
(
p+1∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V p+12
)
−H
(
p+1∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V p+11
)
(198)
The first term in (198) can be rewritten as
H
(
p+1∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V p+12
)
= H
[
m∑
i=k
(
vT1kh1jt1k + u
T
k hp+1+k,jt(k)
)]
(199)
Note that there are in total mMR rational dimensions each taking value from C(a, 2Q). Re-
gardless of the distribution in each rational dimension, the entropy is maximized by uniform
distribution, i.e.,
H
(
p+1∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V p+12
)
≤ log
[
(2Q+ 1)mM˜
]
=
mM˜(1− δ)
MR + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (200)
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The second term in (198) is
H
(
p+1∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V p+11
)
= H
[
m∑
i=k
(
uTk hp+1+k,jt(k)
)]
= log
[
(2Q+ 1)mM
]
(201)
=
mM(1 − δ)
MR + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (202)
Substituting (200) and (202) into (198), we get
I(V1; Yj|V p+12 ) ≤
m(M˜ −M)(1 − δ)
MR + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (203)
We note that
ξ
△
=
m(M˜ −M)(1− δ)
MR + δ
=
m(M˜ −M)(1− δ)
(m+ 1)M˜ + δ
(204)
=
m
[
(l + 1)θ − lθ] (1− δ)
(m+ 1)(l + 1)θ + δ
(205)
=
m
[∑θ−1
k=0
(
θ
k
)
lk
]
(1− δ)
(m+ 1)(l + 1)θ + δ
(206)
The maximum power of l in the numerator is θ − 1 and is less than the power θ of l in
the denominator. This implies that when m and δ are fixed, by choosing l large enough,
the factor before the 1
2
logP term in (203), ξ, can be made arbitrarily small. Due to the
non-perfect (i.e., only asymptotical) alignment, the upper bound for the information leakage
rate is not a constant as in [2], but a function which can be made to approach zero d.o.f.
Similarly, we can derive the following
I(V1;Zk|V p+12 ) ≤ ξ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (207)
where Zk, k = 1, . . . , N , is the external eavesdropper. Substituting (195), (203) and (207)
into (187), we obtain a lower bound for the achievable secrecy rate R1 as
R1 ≥
[
m(1− δ)
(m+ 1)
(
1 + 1
l
)θ
+ δ
lθ
− ξ
](
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (208)
Similarly, it is easy to derive that
Ri ≥
[
(1− δ)
(m+ 1)
(
1 + 1
l
)θ
+ δ
lθ
− ξ′
](
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (209)
for i = 2, . . . , p+1 and ξ′ can be made arbitrarily small. By choosing l →∞ and δ → 0, we
40
can achieve a s.d.o.f. tuple arbitrarily close to
( m
m+ 1
,
1
m+ 1
, . . . ,
1
m+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p items
,
)
(210)
which is (137), completing the proof of Theorem 11.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we determined the entire s.d.o.f. regions of K-user MAC wiretap channel, K-
user IC-EE, K-user IC-CM, and K-user IC-CM-EE. The converse for MAC directly followed
from the results in [1, 2]. The converse for IC was shown to be dominated by secrecy
constraints and interference constraints in different parts. To show the tightness and achieve
the regions characterized by the converses, we provided a general method to investigate
this class of channels, whose s.d.o.f. regions have a polytope structure. We provided an
equivalence between the extreme points in the polytope structure and the rank of sub-
matrices containing all active upper bounds associated with each extreme point. Then, we
achieved each extreme point by relating it to a specific channel model. More specifically,
the extreme points of the MAC region can be achieved by an m-user MAC wiretap channel
with K −m helpers, i.e., by setting K −m users’ secure rates to zero and utilizing them as
pure (structured) cooperative jammers. On the other hand, the asymmetric extreme points
of the IC region can be achieved by a (p + 1)-user IC-CM with m helpers, and N external
eavesdroppers.
A Proof of Theorem 10
Regarding Theorem 10, first, we have few comments:
1) (135) will not be possible until K ≥ 5 due to the constraint K − 2 ≥ p′ ≥ 3.
2) The point in (135) with p′ = K − 1, i.e., (1
2
, 1
2
, . . . , 1
2
, 0), is actually an extreme point,
but since (134) with p = K − 2 also includes it, we classify it as (134) here.
3) Assume that we allow p′ = 2 in (135) with K ≥ 5. Then, the point becomes
d1 =
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0, . . . , 0
)
(211)
However, this is just the middle point of two points in (134). More specifically, by choos-
ing p = 1 in (134), we have d′1 = (
K−2
K−1
, 1
K−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0) and d′′1 = (
1
K−1
, K−2
K−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
(by swapping the first two elements in d′1). Here d
′
1 6= d′′1 due to K ≥ 5, and also it
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is easy to check that d1 =
1
2
(d′1 + d
′′
1), which means that d1 is not an extreme point.
Therefore, in (135) p′ must satisfy p′ ≥ 3.
Now, we start the proof of Theorem 10. In order to speak of a polytope, we re-write (16)
as
−di ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , K (212)
Then, we can write all the left hand sides of (14), (15), (212) as an N ×K matrix H with
corresponding right hand sides forming an N -length column vector h, i.e., all points d in D
satisfy
Hd ≤ h (213)
where N
△
= 2K +
(
K
2
)
= 2K +K(K − 1)/2. For any extreme point d ∈ D, let J(d) be a set
such that
J(d) =
{
l : Hld = hl, l ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
(214)
where Hl is the lth row of H and hl is the lth element of h. Therefore, J(d) represents all
active boundaries. The remaining rows satisfy
Hld < hl (215)
for l 6∈ J .
For convenience, denote by HJ the sub-matrix of H with rows indexed by J
△
= J(d).
Similarly denote by hJ the sub-vector of h with rows indexed by J . In order to find all
extreme points in D, by Theorem 7 in Section 3.1, we need to find all K × (K + 1) sub-
matrices (H′,h′) of (H,h) with rank(H′) = K such that Hd ≤ h and H′d = h′, which
is also equivalent to finding all index sets J representing the active boundaries such that
Hd ≤ h, HJd = hJ , and rank(HJ) = K.
For convenience of presentation, we always partition the set J as a union of mutually
exclusive sets S, P and Z, i.e.,
J = S ∪ P ∪ Z (216)
We denote by S the row indices representing the active boundaries in (14)
S
△
=
{
si
△
= s(i) : Hsid = hsi is (K − 1)di +
K∑
j=1
dj = K − 1, i = 1, . . . , K
}
(217)
where si stands for the function s(i) of the coordinate i with the value as the row index of
H corresponding to the active boundaries (K − 1)di +
∑K
j=1 dj = K − 1. Thus, we have a
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one-to-one mapping between the row index and the function si
△
= s(i), i.e., if the row index
si ∈ J , we know exactly the ith upper bound in (14) is active; on the other hand, if we
know the coordinate i, we can determine the unique corresponding row index in H by the
mapping s : i 7→ si.
Similarly, we denote by P the row indices representing the active boundaries in (15)
P
△
=
{
pV
△
= p(V ) : HpV d = hpV is
∑
i∈V
di = 1, V ⊆ {1, . . . , K}, |V | = 2
}
(218)
where the value of pV is the corresponding row index of H.
Finally, we denote by Z the row indices representing the active boundaries in (212)
Z
△
=
{
zi
△
= z(i) : Hzid = hzi is di = 0, i = 1, . . . , K
}
(219)
where the value of zi is the corresponding row index of H.
There are approximately in total
(
N
K
)
≈
(
K+2
2
)K
eK√
2πK
(220)
possible selections of K equations in (213) for large K. In order for this search to have a
reasonable complexity, we need to investigate the structure of D more carefully. We identify
the following simple properties for the extreme points in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let d be a non-zero extreme point in D. Then, it must satisfy the following
properties:
1) maxk dk ≤ K−1K .
2) At most one element, if there is any, in d is strictly larger than 1
2
.
3) If there exists an element, say di, which is equal to
1
2
, then, dj ≤ di = 12 for all j.
4) If |S| ≥ 2 and ∀si, sj ∈ S, where i 6= j, then 0 < di = dj ≤ 12 .
5) If si ∈ S, then dj ≤ di for all j. Equivalently, if |S| ≥ 1 and si ∈ S, then di =
maxj=1,...,K dj. Equivalently, if |S| ≥ 1 and di = maxj=1,...,K dj, then si ∈ S.
6) If maxi di >
1
2
, then |S| ≤ 1.
The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix B. In addition to the properties of
the elements of the extreme points, we also need some results regarding the rank of the
sub-matrices. It is easy to verify that a trivial necessary condition for rank(HJ) = K is
|S|+ |P |+ |Z| ≥ K. More formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For an extreme point d, rank(HJ) = K only if
rank(HS∪P ) + |Z| ≥ K (221)
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Lemma 4 Let d be a non-zero extreme point of D. If |P | ≥ 1 and maxk dk > 12 , then there
exists a coordinate i∗ such that
K − 1
K
≥ di∗ = max
k
dk >
1
2
(222)
and a non-empty set
U ′
△
=
{
j : dj = 1− di∗ > 0
}
(223)
with cardinality m′
△
= |U ′| = |P | and
P = P ′
△
=
{
pV : V = {i∗, j}, j ∈ U ′
}
(224)
In addition, S is either empty or
S = {si∗} (225)
Futhermore,
rank(HS∪P ) = |P |+ 1{|S|≥1} (226)
where 1{·} is the indicator function.
Lemma 5 Let d be a non-zero extreme point of D. If |P | ≥ 1 and maxk dk ≤ 12 , then there
exists a non-empty set
U ′′ =
{
i : di =
1
2
}
(227)
with cardinality m′′
△
= |U ′′|, 2 ≤ m′′ ≤ K − 1, and
P = P ′′
△
=
{
pV : V = {k, j}, k 6= j, and k, j ∈ U ′′
}
(228)
with rank
rank(HP ) =
{
m′′, |P | > 1
1, |P | = 1 (229)
In addition, S is either empty or
S =
{
si : i ∈ U ′′
}
(230)
Futhermore,
rank(HS∪P ) =
{
1, |P | = 1 and |S| = 0
m′′ + 1{|S|≥1}, o.w.
(231)
where 1{·} is the indicator function.
The proofs of Lemmas 3, 4, and 5 are provided in Appendix B.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 10.
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Case: |Z| = K. Clearly, rank(HZ) = K and only the zero vector satisfies
H0 ≤ h (232)
HZ0 = hZ (233)
Thus, 0 is an extreme point of D, which is (133). Therefore, in the remaining discussion we
focus on non-zero points and |Z| < K.
Case: |P | = 0. Since |Z| < K, by Lemma 3, |S| ≥ 1.
If |S| = 1, then again by Lemma 3, |Z| = K − 1. By property 5) of Lemma 2, S = {si}
for some i and Z = {zj : j 6= i}. The extreme point d has the structure (134) with p = 0.
If |S| = K, then by property 4) of Lemma 2, Z = φ, and the corresponding extreme
point is (136).
If 2 ≤ |S| ≤ K − 1, due the positiveness implied by property 4) of Lemma 2 and
the cardinality constraint by Lemma 3, the only consistent Z, which gives a solution for
HJd = hJ , is
Z =
{
zj : sj 6∈ S
}
(234)
Denote by x any di for si ∈ S. Then, we have
Kx+ (|S| − 1)x = K − 1 (235)
which implies that
x =
K − 1
K − 1 + |S| (236)
Since P is empty, x must satisfy x < 1
2
due to |S| ≥ 2 and property 4) of Lemma 2.
Substituting (236) into x < 1
2
gives |S| > K − 1, which contradicts the assumption |S| < K.
Therefore, the solution given by HJd = hJ , where J = S ∪ Z, violates (215).
Case: |P | ≥ 1 and maxk dk > 12 . First of all, due to the positiveness implied by (222) and
(223), the consistent set Z must satisfy
Z ⊆
{
zk : k 6∈ {i∗} ∪ U ′
}
(237)
which implies |Z| ≤ K − |U ′| − 1 = K − |P | − 1.
If S is empty, by Lemma 4, rank(HS∪P ) = |P |, which implies
rank(HS∪P ) + |Z| < K (238)
which implies that rank(HJ) < K, which does not give any extreme point, by Lemma 3.
Therefore, S is non-empty and determined by (225). In addition, Lemma 4 gives
rank(HS∪P ) = |P |+ 1 (239)
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If |P | = K − 1, due to (223) and (225), we have the equality in (14) hold for i∗, i.e.,
Kdi∗ + (K − 1)(1− di∗) = K − 1 (240)
which leads to di∗ = 0 contradicting (222).
Therefore, |P | < K − 1. Then, the consistent set Z satisfying Lemma 3 is
Z =
{
zk : k 6∈ {i∗} ∪ U ′
}
(241)
In addition, due to (223) and (225), we have the equality in (14) hold for i∗, i.e.,
Kdi∗ + |P |(1− di∗) = K − 1 (242)
which implies that
di∗ =
K − 1− |P |
K − |P | (243)
Since di∗ = maxk dk >
1
2
, we have
|P | < K − 2 (244)
The solution of this choice is exactly (134) with 1 ≤ p < K − 2, and it satisfies (213).
Case: |P | ≥ 1 and maxk dk ≤ 12 . If S is empty, then by Lemma 5,
rank(HS∪P ) =
{
m′′, |P | > 1
1, |P | = 1 (245)
wherem′′ is the cardinality of U ′′ defined in (227). Sincem′′ ≥ 2, for both cases, rank(HS∪P ) ≤
m′′. Due to the positiveness of the elements in U ′′, |Z| ≤ K −m′′. Therefore, by Lemma 3,
the cardinality of Z can only take the value |Z| = K −m′′, i.e.,
dj = 0, ∀j 6∈ U ′′ (246)
Also, Lemma 3 implies that |P | > 1 and m′′ > 2; otherwise, rank(HS∪P ) + |Z| = 1 + |Z| ≤
1 +K −m′′ ≤ K − 1 < K.
Therefore, the elements in d are either 1
2
or 0, and the number of 1
2
s is m′′. Note that S
is empty. Therefore, for any i ∈ U ′′, we must have the equality in (14) not hold, i.e.,
K
2
+ (m′′ − 1)1
2
< K − 1 (247)
which indicates that
m′′ < K − 1 (248)
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Combining with the condition m′′ > 2 gives an extreme point that has the structure (135).
It remains to discuss the case where S is non-empty. By Lemma 5, S is determined by
(230) and
rank(HS∪P ) = m
′′ + 1 (249)
If m′′ = K − 1, then the only solution is given by choosing Z = {zj : j 6∈ U ′′} with
|Z| = 1, which is the structure in (134) with p = K − 2.
If m′′ < K − 1, then rank(HS∪P ) < K. By Lemma 3 and the positiveness implied by U ′′
with cardinality m′′, Z must satisfy
K −m′′ ≥ |Z| ≥ K − rank(HS∪P ) = K −m′′ − 1 > 0 (250)
i.e., Z is not empty and the extreme point d has either K−m′′−1 or K−m′′ zero(s). On the
other hand, d also has in total m′′ 1
2
s due to the definition of U ′′ in (227). If |Z| = K −m′′,
then the extreme point d has the following form
di =
{
1
2
, i ∈ U ′′
0, i 6∈ U ′′ (251)
and we must have the equality in (14) hold for some i ∈ U ′′, i.e.,
K
2
+ (m′′ − 1)1
2
= K − 1 (252)
which is not valid since m′′ < K−1. Therefore, the equations corresponding to the selection
of J are inconsistent. On the other hand, if |Z| = K −m′′ − 1, then the extreme point d
has the following form
di =


1
2
, i ∈ U ′′
0, zi ∈ Z
x, o.w.
(253)
where 0 < x < 1
2
. Again, we must have the equality in (14) hold for some i ∈ U ′′, i.e.,
K
2
+ (m′′ − 1)1
2
+ x = K − 1 (254)
which implies that
x =
K − 1−m′′
2
(255)
Substituting this formula into 0 < x < 1
2
leads to
K − 2 < m′′ < K − 1 (256)
which is not possible since m′′ is an integer, which completes the proof of Theorem 10.
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B Proofs of Lemma 2 through 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
We prove all the properties one by one.
1) The constraint (14) and the positiveness constraint in (16) imply that for any coordinate
i, we have
Kdi ≤ Kdi +
∑
j 6=i
dj = K − 1 (257)
i.e., di ≤ K−1K for any i. Therefore, maxk dk ≤ K−1K .
2) We prove by contradiction. Assume that we have distinct coordinates, i, j, such that
di, dj >
1
2
in d. Then, the set V
△
= {i, j} with |V | = 2 violates the constraint in (15).
Therefore, this contradiction implies that at most one element, if any, in d is strictly larger
than 1
2
.
3) Similarly, assume that there exists a j such that dj >
1
2
. Since di =
1
2
by assumption,
di + dj > 1, which violates constraint (15). This implies that dj ≤ di = 12 for all j.
4) Let i, j ∈ S and i 6= j. Due to the definition of S, si, sj ∈ S, i.e., from (217)
Kdi + dj +
K∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
dk = K − 1 (258)
Kdj + di +
K∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
dk = K − 1 (259)
which implies (K − 1)di = (K − 1)dj. Since K − 1 > 0, di = dj. Furthermore, due to
property 2), both are no larger than 1
2
, and due to property 3), for any k, dk ≤ di. If di = 0,
then the point d is the zero vector, which contradicts the assumption that d is a non-zero
extreme point in D. Therefore, di = dj > 0.
5) The three equivalent statements in this property are simply from three different per-
spectives addressing the same fact that the coordinates of d, which are associated with the
elements in S, are the most significant coordinates. We will prove the first statement and
then prove the equivalence of all three statements.
We prove the first statement of property 5) by contraction. Assume that there exists a j
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such that dj > di. Then, consider the following expression (for K ≥ 3)
Kdj + di +
K∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
dk = dj + di + (K − 1)dj +
K∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
dk (260)
> dj + di + (K − 1)di +
K∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
dk (261)
= Kdi +
K∑
k=1,k 6=i
dk (262)
= K − 1 (263)
where the last equality is due to the assumption si ∈ S. This result violates the constraint
(14). Therefore, for all j, dj ≤ di.
Next, we prove the second statement of property 5) using the first statement. This is
trivially true because the assumption |S| ≥ 1 and si ∈ S imply that, by the first statement,
di ≥ dj for all j, i.e., di = maxj dj.
Then, we prove the third statement of property 5) using the second statement. By
assumption, let di = maxk dk. However, assume that si 6∈ S. This implies that there exists
another coordinate j, j 6= i such that sj ∈ S (since |S| ≥ 1) and thereby by the second
statement dj = maxk dk = di. Then, consider
Kdi + dj +
K∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
dk = Kdj + di +
K∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
dk = K − 1 (264)
where the last equality is due to sj ∈ S. This implies that si must belong to S by definition
in (217), i.e., si ∈ S, which contradicts the assumption that si 6∈ S.
Finally, we prove the first statement of property 5) using the third statement. We prove
this by contradiction as well. As stated in the condition of the first statement, si ∈ S,
this means |S| ≥ 1. Assume that there exists at least one element which is strictly larger
than di. Choose the largest one among them and denote it by dj. Clearly, j 6= i and
dj = maxk dk > di. By the third statement, sj ∈ S. Then, |S| ≥ 2 and by property 4)
di = dj, which contradicts the assumption dj > di.
6) We prove |S| ≤ 1 by contraction. Assume that |S| ≥ 2. Due to property 4) and the second
statement of property 5), we have two distinct j, k ∈ S such that 1
2
≥ dj = dk = maxi di > 12 ,
which leads to a contradiction. Thus, |S| ≤ 1.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
It is straightforward that
rank(HZ) = |Z| (265)
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since there are in total |Z| 1s in the sub-matrix HZ and the row index and column index of
any two 1s are different. Since (S ∪ P ) ∩ Z = φ, we have
K = rank(HJ) = rank(HS∪P∪Z) ≤ rank(HS∪P ) + rank(HZ) (266)
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4
If |P | = 1, then P = {pV } for a unique V = {i, j} with |V | = 2. If di = dj, then
di = dj =
1
2
and maxk dk ≤ 12 due to property 3) of Lemma 2, which contradicts the
condition maxk dk >
1
2
. Therefore, di 6= dj. Without loss of generality, let di > dj, then
di >
1
2
and i is the i∗ required in Lemma 4 due to property 2) of Lemma 2. By property 1) of
Lemma 2, dj = 1− di∗ > 0, thus j ∈ U ′. If there exists any k, k 6= j, such that dk = 1− di∗ ,
then clearly V ′
△
= {i∗, k} 6= V , but pV ′ ∈ P , which contradicts the condition |P | = 1. Hence,
U ′ = {j} and P satisfies (224).
If |P | ≥ 2, assume that V1 = {i, j}, V2 = {x, y}, V1 6= V2, and pV1 , pV2 ∈ P . Without loss
of generality, let di = maxk∈{i,j,x,y} dk. If di <
1
2
, then dj+ di < 1, which contradicts pV1 ∈ P .
If di =
1
2
, then due to property 3) of Lemma 2, maxk dk ≤ 12 , which contradicts the condition
maxk dk >
1
2
. Therefore, di = maxk∈{i,j,x,y} dk >
1
2
and i is the i∗ required in Lemma 4. For
any pV ∈ P , let V = {a, b} and assume da ≥ db. If da = 12 , this leads to a contradiction of
di∗ >
1
2
due to property 3) of Lemma 2. Thus, da >
1
2
. Due to property 2) of Lemma 2, the
coordinate a must be i∗, i.e., a = i∗. Then, db = 1 − di∗ > 0 and that is true for any pV .
Hence, |P | = |U ′| and (224) are trivially true.
If S is empty, we have a sub-matrix which has the form (by removing all columns con-
taining all zeros and rearranging the columns)
HS∪P = HP
·
=


1 1 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 0 . . . 1

 (267)
where the number of rows is |P | = |U ′|, the number of columns is |P |+ 1, and the index of
the first column corresponds to i∗ and the indices of other columns correspond to U
′ defined
in (223). Therefore, rank(HS∪P ) = |P | and we are done.
If S is not empty, due to (222) and property 6) of Lemma 2, |S| = 1. Furthermore, due
to property 5) of Lemma 2, si∗ ∈ S, which is (225). Note that HS is a K-length row vector
containing no zeros. If |P |+ 1 < K, then HS has more columns than the sub-matrix on the
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right hand side of (267). HS∪P = |P |+ 1 is true. If |P |+ 1 = K, then
HP∪S =


1 1 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 0 . . . 1
K 1 1 1 . . . 1


△
=M(K) (268)
where M(n) is n× n square matrix as in (268), where n ≥ 2. Therefore, HP∪S = M(K). If
we denote f(n)
△
= det[M(n)], then it is easy to write the recursive formula as
f(n) = (−1)n − f(n− 1), n ≥ 3 (269)
f(2) = 1−K (270)
which gives that f(n) = (−1)n(n−K − 1), i.e., detHP∪S = detM(K) = (−1)K+1 6= 0 and
rank(HP∪S) = |P |+ 1 = K, which completes the proof.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5
If maxk dK <
1
2
, then |P | = 0, which contradicts the assumption |P | ≥ 1. Therefore,
maxk dK =
1
2
, which implies |U ′′| ≥ 1. Assume that i∗ ∈ U ′′. Due to property 3) of Lemma
2, dj ≤ di∗ = 12 for all j. If maxk 6=i∗ dk < 12 , then we cannot find a set V such that |V | = 2 and∑
k∈V dk = 1, i.e., |P | = 0, which contradicts the assumption |P | ≥ 1. Thus, m′′
△
= |U ′′| ≥ 2.
On the other hand, if m′′ = K, by definition of U ′′, all elements in d are 1
2
, which violates
the constraint (14). Therefore, m′′ ≤ K − 1.
Next, P ′′ defined in (228) satisfies P ′′ ⊆ P . On the other hand, for any coordinate pair
(k′, j′) such that k′ 6= j′ and p{k′,j′} ∈ P , since dk′, dj′ ≤ 12 , we must have dk′ = dj′ = 12 , and
by definition of U ′′, k′, j′ ∈ U ′′, which implies p{k′,j′} ∈ P ′′. Therefore, P = P ′′.
If S is empty, then HP = 1 if |P | = 1 and we are done. If S is empty but |P | > 1,
the index set of the columns of HP , which contains nonzero elements, is U
′′ due to (228).
Therefore, rank(HP ) ≤ |U ′′| = m′′. In order to study the rank, we remove the columns
containing all zeros and rearrange the columns. Assume that
U ′′ =
{
i1, i2, . . . , im′′
}
(271)
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where i1 = i∗. Then, consider a m
′′ ×m′′ sub-matrix of HP
HJ ′′
·
=


1 1 0 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 0 1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 0 0 . . . 1
0 1 1 0 0 . . . 0


(272)
where
J ′′
△
= {pV : V = {i∗, ij}, j = 2, . . . , m′′} ∪ {p{i2,i3}} ⊆ P (273)
It is easy to verify that detHJ ′′ = (−1)m′′ × 2 6= 0, therefore rank(HJ ′′) = m′′, i.e.,
rank(HP ) = m
′′. This completes the proof of the case where S is empty.
Assume that |S| ≥ 1, by property 5) of Lemma 2, S must have the form of (230). If
|P | = 1, m′′ = |U ′′| = 2. Then, the 3×K matrix HP∪S must have the structure
HP∪S=

 1 1 0 0 0 . . . 0K 1 1 1 1 . . . 1
1 K 1 1 1 . . . 1

 (274)
where the indices of the first two columns belong to U ′′. Clearly, HP∪S = 3 = m
′′ + 1 since
m′′ = 2.
If |P | > 1, by using the J ′′ in (273) and the condition m′′ ≤ K − 1, we have
HJ ′′∪S =


1 1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 0 . . . 0 1 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 1 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
K 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 1 . . . 1
1 K 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 1 . . . 1
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 1 1 . . . K 1 1 1 . . . 1
1 1 1 1 . . . 1 K 1 1 . . . 1


(275)
Due to [54, Section 2.2, Problem 7],
rank(HP∪S) = rank(HJ ′′∪S) = rank(HJ ′′) + 1 = m
′′ + 1 (276)
which completes the proof.
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